Chapman Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 1

Article 8

2018

The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian
Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a
Broken Constitutional Order
Sanford Levinson
University of Texas

Mark A. Graber
University of Maryland

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken
Constitutional Order, 21 Chap. L. Rev. 133 ().
Available at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol21/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized editor of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW
Citation: Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of
Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken
Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 133 (2018).
--For copyright information, please contact chapmanlawreview@chapman.edu.

CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY | FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW | ONE UNIVERSITY DRIVE | ORANGE,
CALIFORNIA 92866
WWW.CHAPMANLAWREVIEW.COM

Do Not Delete

3/21/18 4:40 PM

The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian
Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a
Broken Constitutional Order*
Sanford Levinson** and Mark A. Graber***
INTRODUCTION
Herbert Wechsler’s On Neutral Principles in Constitutional
Law is one of the most widely cited1 and reviled essays in the legal
literature. After declaring that judicial decisions “must be genuinely
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved,”2 Wechsler insisted that the most
canonical of all twentieth century cases, Brown v. Board of
Education, did not meet this standard.3 Wechsler first maintained
that justices applying neutral principles would treat segregated
schools as raising “freedom of association” issues.4 He then
professed to be unable to discern a proper neutral principle that
would constitutionally justify a judicial decision forcing whites who
did not wish to associate with African-Americans to attend the
same public schools as students of color.5 Wechsler was correctly
chastised for what many, most notably Charles Black,
demonstrated was a stunning obtuseness to the realities of
American history and the role that sheer racism played (and,

* We are grateful to the editors of the Chapman Law Review and to Dean Tom
Campbell for encouraging us to collect our thoughts on this matter. We have also
benefitted from the responses of Aziz Huq, Keith Whittington, and Kenneth Kersch, not to
mention many conversations with colleagues and co-participants at conferences in
Madison, Wisconsin, and New Orleans.
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
*** Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.
1 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012).
2 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
3 Id. at 22; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 34.
5 Id.
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for that matter, continues to play) in allocating the burdens and
benefits of life in the United States.6 To accept Wechsler’s notion
that constitutional law should in essence ignore self-conscious
and public Southern-white efforts to establish racial apartheid,
whatever might be thought to be constitutional commands to the
contrary, is akin to writing a guide to normal everyday life for
Londoners in 1941 that ignored the Battle of Britain.
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown has been confined to the
dustbin of history, but his claim that constitutional decision
makers should abstract constitutional law problems from their
underlying constitutional politics is alive and well in the legal
literature on executive power in the age of Donald Trump.
Experts and pundits commonly claim that President Trump is
constitutionally entitled to exercise the same constitutional
authority as has been historically exercised by other presidents.
Journalists and constitutional analysts insist that courts should
engage in “business as usual” when evaluating President Donald
Trump’s exercise of executive power. The Washington Post gave
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals a scolding when the judges
quoted Trump’s bigoted remarks on the campaign trail as
reasons for finding unconstitutional a federal order severely
limiting immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries.7
The Post’s editorial quite correctly declared that in the past,
“Presidents have enjoyed, and deserve, broad leeway when it
comes to setting immigration limits.”8 Lest one dismiss the Post
writers as lacking in the requisite legal training, leading
constitutional experts on prominent blogs, at least some of whom
acknowledge that President Trump is woefully unqualified for
office, nonetheless agree with the Post that courts should declare
unconstitutional executive orders issued by the Trump
Administration only if that tribunal would strike down an
identical order issued by a more competent president for the
same reasons. Josh Blackman claims that “[t]he judiciary should

6 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 427–29, 427 n.19 (1960).
7 Editorial Board, Mr. Trump’s travel ban is offensive and imprudent. But is it really
unconstitutional?, W ASH. P OST (May 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/mr-trumps-travel-ban-is-offensive-and-imprudent-but-is-it-really-unconstitutional/
2017/05/28/901947d0-41aa-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html?utm_term=.2952d4c6ebd8
[http://perma.cc/2RGA-U6EY].
8 Id. (emphasis added).
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not abandon its traditional role simply because the president has
abandoned his.”9
When judges treat this president as anything other than normal, it
sends a signal to the public that the chief executive is not as
legitimate as his predecessors. . . . Trump was elected through the
same constitutional process by which judges received their lifetime
commissions. He should be treated as such.10

Defense department experts have informed Congress that
President Trump has the same power to begin a nuclear war as
any other president. “If we were to change the decision-making
process because of a distrust of this president,” former
undersecretary for policy at the Defense Department Brian
McKeon asserted, “that would be an unfortunate decision for the
next president.”11
This claim that all presidents enjoy the same Article II
prerogatives was an implicit staple of the literature on executive
power published prior to the 2016 election. Consider a brilliant
article, The President’s Enforcement Power, published in 2013 by
University of Michigan professor of law Kate Andrias.12 Her
subject, the discretion a president has to determine the actual
enforcement of the law, could hardly be a more important topic in
light of President Obama’s bitterly contested order that many
undocumented aliens be freed from the potential burden of
deportation if they present no genuine threat to the United
States,13 or Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision not to enforce
clearly valid federal drug laws14 against various Coloradans who
9 Josh Blackman, Why Courts Shouldn’t Try to Read Trump’s Mind, POLITCO (Mar.
16, 2017) (emphasis added), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/why-courtsshouldnt-try-to-read-trumps-mind-214921 [http://perma.cc/F8GB-PYB4].
10 Id.
11 Karoun Demirjian, Trump’s nuclear authority divides senators alarmed by his
‘volatile’ behavior, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/power
post/senators-deadlock-in-debate-over-whether-to-restrain-trumps-nuclear-launch-authority/
2017/11/14/491a994a-c95b-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.15b6498a5436
[http://perma.cc/Z6E5-NW3C].
12 See generally Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1031 (2013).
13 See Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. But see Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 135, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (enjoining enforcement of the order).
14 See Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington,
Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-
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were taking advantage of the legalization of marijuana
possession and sale in that state. Professor Andrias’ article is
extremely illuminating in many ways. What is especially striking
from the perspective of 2017 is the essay’s unrelenting
abstraction in the tradition of “Neutral Principles.” There are
allusions to Washington and Obama, among many other
presidents, but the article is very much, as promised by the title,
about the constitutional authority of a reified president to
determine how laws are, or are not, enforced.15 Professor
Andrias, like other distinguished scholars of executive power,16
offers interesting proposals to govern the conduct of all possible
occupants of the White House implementing laws passed by all
possible Congresses.17
More fairly, we should write all “conceivable” occupants of
the Oval Office as of 2013. No one writing about presidential
power before the 2016 election could genuinely conceive of the
possibility that Barack Obama would be succeeded by Donald
Trump or a person equally as unfit for office. Staying within one,
or even two, standard deviations of the norm is usually sufficient.
When thinking of presidents, scholars should account for
Franklin Pierce as well as Franklin Roosevelt, but good reason
exists for thinking that the differences among the first forty-five
presidents did not warrant significant variation in their formal
legal powers. We do not usually require that scholars consider a
wildly improbable figure, three standard deviations away, as
would have been the case had Andrias or any other student of

doj_n_3837034.html [http://perma.cc/LR6N-GFTX]. Attorney General Sessions has
recently announced his decision to reverse the Holder policy. See, e.g., Jon Hill, Sessions
Reverses Obama-Era Marijuana Enforcement Policy, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2018, 6:20 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/998871/sessions-reverses-obama-era-marijuanaenforcement-policy.
15 See generally Andrias, supra note 12.
16 For a sampling, see David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 699 n.20 (2008), citing the most influential pieces of scholarship
on executive power over the last half century, none of which suggest that the legal power
of presidents varies by office-holder. Substantial literature exists in political science
pointing out that presidential capacity to exercise these fixed legal powers varies by
officeholder and time. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT,
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (The Free Press ed., 1990); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (4th ed. 1972).
17 Id. at 1078.
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executive power considered the possibility that a bigoted,
uninformed, serial liar would assume the powers of the oval
office. John Hart Ely highlighted this facet of ordinary scholarship
when his conclusion to his monumental Democracy and Distrust
explained why his theory of representation reinforcement—and
the concomitant rejection of the Supreme Court’s aggressively
enforcing non-textual “fundamental rights”—did not prevent a
hypothetical Congress from prohibiting the removal of gall
bladders except when necessary to save the person’s life.18 Ely
asserted that such a bill “couldn’t pass” in our actual political
system and “refuse[d] to play the game”19 of constructing a
constitutional theory concerned with what in context are the
equivalent of science-fiction hypotheticals dealing with invasions
by space aliens.
The flying saucers have landed. Donald J. Trump is now
President of the United States. We are often informed that
elections have consequences. What this means, of course, is that
at least on occasion, the specific identity of those who win
elections and are empowered to make decisions can have
significant consequences, for good and for ill. As of January 2018
when we completed our revisions of this essay, one can discern
an ever-growing consensus among at least a solid majority of the
American public and probably at least ninety percent of the
politically informed public that Trump is manifestly unfit to be
president. That he is president is the consequence of a severe
malfunction in the constitutional system for electing presidents,
whether one assigns the failure to the constitutional text, the
constitutional culture, or, as is almost certainly the case, both.20
The question we must now ask is whether this constitutional
failure is a subject only for political science or whether
constitutional decision-makers, when interpreting Article II,

18 J OHN H ART E LY , D EMOCRACY AND D ISTRUST : A T HEORY OF J UDICIAL R EVIEW
182–83 (1980).
19 Id. at 183.
20 Donald Trump’s election was also the consequence of a presidential primary
system not imagined by those who designed the Constitution. He was immeasurably
aided by having more than a dozen rivals at the beginning of the process and half a dozen
until the last few primaries. This enabled him to prevail, especially in first-past-the-post
states, with considerably less than a majority of the vote. Trump’s failure to obtain a
plurality of the final national vote made him the first president in history to have lost
both the majority of his party’s primary vote and the popular vote in the ensuing national
election.
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ought to take into account that Americans have elected a chief
executive manifestly unfit to exercise the longstanding powers of
the presidency. When Justice Joseph Story in Martin v. Mott
spoke of “the high qualities which the Executive must be
presumed to possess, of public virtue, and honest devotion to the
public interests,”21 was he speaking of a conclusive or a
rebuttable presumption?
As readers may already have guessed, we challenge this
almost unexamined assumption that the constitutional powers of
the president can be blithely abstracted from the occupant of the
White House. We insist that constitutional decision makers must
take into account (assuming they realize) whether they are
making decisions for a constitutional order functioning within
normal parameters or, on the contrary, a constitutional order
reeling from the collapse of crucial assumptions underlying the
constitutional text and ordinary constitutional practice. We
maintain that the Article II powers of a president manifestly
unfit for office are different from the Article II powers of a
president who has the character and capabilities appropriate for
exercising those powers. Common sense, The Federalist Papers,
other interpretive activities, and Brown v. Board of Education
provide strong reasons for not vesting the anti-Publian president
with Publian powers.
Our argument proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly
elaborating the consensus that Donald Trump lacks the
constitutional, even if not the “legal,” qualifications to be
President of the United States. The next section discusses how
Publius in The Federalist Papers closely yoked presidential
powers to the character of the office-holder. We then note how
such other interpretive exercises as plays, athletics, and contract
law routinely make adjustments when events undermine the
assumptions underlying the authoritative text, whether that text
be instantiated in a script, play, or bargain. American
constitutional practice, we continue, has been historically far
more responsive to Publian failures than contemporary claims
about executive power under President Trump acknowledge.
Such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education22 and New York

21
22

Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 32 (1827).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Times Co. v. Sullivan23 are far better explained as judicial
responses to constitutional frauds perpetrated by the Jim Crow
South than the more abstracted reasons given by the justices in
their opinions. Brown, in fact, provides a model for thinking
about limiting the power of an anti-Publian president. Such
judicial strategies include focusing on actual motives for
executive action, taking rationality standards seriously, and
limiting, wherever possible, official powers when the officeholder
or officeholders demonstrate that they are incapable of using or
unwilling to use those powers responsibly or consistently with
established constitutional norms.
Given our ostensible 5000-word limit, very generously
interpreted to mean 5000 words per author, our essay is
necessarily provocative. We hope to initiate an important—and
overdue—conversation rather than provide anything in the way
of definitive answers (even assuming such things exist with
regard to complex legal and political dilemmas). Both of us
believe the American constitutional order is broken, even as we
dispute the nature of the malady and the remedy.24 We also
agree that the remedy for a broken constitutional order is not
constitutional interpretation as usual. Doing so, we think, is
analogous to telling a quarterback to throw a long pass because
that was the called-for play, even though the receiver has fallen
down. At the very least, we hope to convince readers that
the Constitution of the United States might not be
officeholder-indifferent, and that constitutional politics as usual
is not the remedy for the Trump presidency or, for that matter,
the severe crisis of American constitutional democracy. The
pages below provide one, but hardly the exclusive, path for
constitutional decision makers and American citizens to begin
thinking about presidential power in light of the actual
officeholder and, more generally, to think about constitutional
practice in a time of severe constitutional failure.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS
OF GOVERNANCE (2012) (arguing the American constitutional order is broken); Mark A.
Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a
Dysfunction Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2014).
23
24
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I. DONALD TRUMP AS THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT
President Donald Trump lacks every constitutional
qualification for office save that he was elected consistently with
the rules set out in Article II of the Constitution of the United
States, including, obviously, the Electoral College. Trump is
known to be proudly ignorant, uninterested in constitutional
limits on his power, a probable sex offender, a likely associate of
Russian mobsters eager to launder their money by lending to
someone who cannot procure loans from almost any leading
American bank given his demonstrated record in refusing to
honor his debts,25 a bully, and a bigot who professes to see no real
difference between George Washington and Robert E. Lee.
James Clapper, the former Director of National Intelligence,
told CNN following an August 2017 Trump campaign rally in
Phoenix, Arizona that he “really question[s] [Trump’s] ability to
be—his fitness to be—in this office.”26 After labeling Trump’s
remarks and demeanor “downright scary and disturbing,”27
Clapper, who served in the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama
Administrations, denounced Trump’s “behavior and divisiveness
and complete intellectual, moral and ethical void,”28 describing
his presidency as “this nightmare[.]”29 Clapper was particularly
disturbed about presidential access to, and power to put into
operation, America’s nuclear codes. “In a fit of pique he decides to
do something about Kim Jong Un, there’s actually very little to
stop him,” Clapper said. “The whole system is built to ensure
rapid response if necessary. So there’s very little in the way
of controls over exercising a nuclear option, which is pretty
damn scary.”30
That most Democrats or political liberals might readily agree
with Clapper is hardly surprising. What is remarkable, though,
is the extent to which Donald Trump’s gross unfitness for office

25 We cannot, of course, supply sufficient proof of this assertion because of his
resolute refusal to release any of his tax returns that might well indicate significant
interaction with Russian moguls.
26 Leinz Vales, James Clapper calls Trump speech ‘downright scary and disturbing’,
CNN (Aug. 24, 2017, 5:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/23/politics/james-clappertrump-phoenix-rally-don-lemon-cnntv/index.html [http://perma.cc/9KL7-WPD8].
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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has become the conventional wisdom among conservative
commentators. Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson, who
loyally served George W. Bush as a speechwriter and a conduit to
the Christian community, describes Trump as “willfully blind to
history” with “a shriveled emptiness where [his] soul once
resided.”31 Gerson is not alone among conservatives in his
contempt for Trump. George Will, who re-registered as an
independent after Trump’s nomination, observed that Trump has
“an untrained mind bereft of information and married to
stratospheric self-confidence.”32 Jack Goldsmith, a lawyer who
headed the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush II administration,
describes Trump as a “President of the United States who does
not at all grasp the Office he occupies, and who thus entirely
lacks the proper situation sense, or contextual knowledge, in
which a President should exercise judgment or act.”33 Benjamin
Wittes, the editor of Lawfare who is associated with both the
Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institution, declared that
Trump “does not enter office with a presumption that as
President he will pursue a vision of what national security
means . . . or that he will do so in a rational fashion[.]”34 “What
does it even mean,” he asked, “for a person who contradicts
himself constantly, who says all kinds of crazy things, who has
unknown but extensive financial dealings that could be affected
by his actions, and who makes up facts as needed in the moment
to swear an oath to faithfully execute the office?”35 Peter Wehner,
who served Republican Presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush,
and George W. Bush, recently referred, approvingly, to “a
Republican member of Congress [he] spoke with [who] called the

31 Michael Gerson, There is a shriveled emptiness where Trump’s soul once resided,
WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/there-is-a-shriveledemptiness-where-trumps-soul-once-resided/2017/08/17/bb9edd22-8370-11e7-b359-15a3617
c767b_story.html?utm_term=.aaa9527e2dd8 [http://perma.cc/BN78-B936].
32 George F. Will, Trump has a dangerous disability, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-has-a-dangerous-disability/2017/
05/03/56ca6118-2f6b-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?utm_term=.43785bf8d842
[http://perma.cc/ZQE4-LQW6].
33 Jack Goldsmith, Two Reflections on the Comey Statement, LAWFARE
(June 7, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/two-reflections-comey-statement
[http://perma.cc/Z2WA-NEJQ].
34 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whathappens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH].
35 Id.
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president a ‘child king,’ and a ‘self-pitying fool.’”36 Continued
hopes that Trump as president will prove significantly different
from what he had revealed about himself during the campaign
are naïve. Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times notes that
“[l]ast November, 63 million voters gave Trump a chance to grow
into the office he won . . . Instead, he seems intent on proving
that he’s either unable or unwilling to grow.”37 Daniel Drezner
answers the question, “Can Donald Trump Grow up in office?” by
responding, “toddlers are gonna toddler.”38
The above sources are all prior to September 2017, when this
essay was initially drafted and submitted to the editors of the
Chapman Law Review. The ensuing months have provided an
abundance of additional sources. Consider an October 26, 2017
column by Mr. Gerson praising Republican senators John
McCain and Bob Corker for their criticisms of Donald Trump.
McCain and Corker pointed to the undoubted truth that
“Americans have elected a president who is dangerously
unstable, divisive, childish, nasty, deceptive, self-deluded,
morally unfit, deeply unconservative and thus badly wrong on
some of the largest issues of our time.”39 Arizona Senator Jeff
Flake, who recently denounced Trump—and, by implication, the
contemporary Republican Party—while announcing his own
decision to retire from the Senate rather than face almost certain
defeat in the Republican primary, describes the
[M]oral vandalism that has been set loose in our culture, as well as
the seeming disregard for the institutions of American democracy. The
damage to our democracy seems to come daily now, most recently with
the president’s venting late last week that if he had his way, he
would hijack the American justice system to conduct political
prosecutions—a practice that happens only in the very worst places on

36 Peter Wehner, Behold Our ‘Child King,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/opinion/sunday/trump-our-child-king.html?ref=
opinion&_r=0.
37 Doyle McManus, Another day, another vulgar Trump tweet. The president clearly
isn’t learning on the job., L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.latimes.
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-trump-tweet-mike-20170629-story.html
[http://perma.cc/CV7H-TSZV].
38 Daniel W. Drezner, Can Donald Trump grow up in office?, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/03/can-donald-trump-growup-in-office/?utm_term=.bb6933cad2bb [http://perma.cc/3C4S-RFZ2].
39 Michael Gerson, God bless all the anti-Trump Republicans, WASH. POST (Oct. 26,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/god-bless-all-the-anti-trump-republicans/
2017/10/26/14f45b9a-ba80-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html?utm_term=. c452e623f3db
[http://perma.cc/GGR9-RHC7].
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earth. And as this behavior continues, it is not just our politics being
disfigured, but the American sense of well-being and time-honored
notions of the common good.40

Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House
dominated the news in early January 2018. Wolff quoted
numerous White House insiders who referred to the President as
an “idiot” or the equivalent of a “child” with an insatiable need for
loyalty and approval. These observations, the above paragraphs
demonstrate, are neither new nor surprising. What may be most
striking is Wolff’s conclusion to an article he published in The
Hollywood Reporter, which maintained Trump may be exhibiting
signs of dementia. “Hoping for the best,” Wolff wrote:
[W]ith their personal futures as well as the country’s future depending
on it, my indelible impression of talking to [Trump’s associations in
the White House] and observing them through much of the first year
of his presidency . . . came to believe he was incapable of functioning
in his job.
At Mar-a-Lago, just before the new year, a heavily made-up Trump
failed to recognize a succession of old friends.41

That Donald Trump is no George Washington is of less
constitutional concern to contemporary Americans than to the
framers. Publius imagined presidents in the image of
Washington, who rise above the partisan strife of their day. Such
characters were recognized as being “pre-eminent for ability and
virtue”42 across the political spectrum. The two-party system that
developed almost immediately after the Constitution was ratified
(and which developed in part because of the structure of
presidential elections)43 obviated the possibility of a universally
esteemed president. Partisan presidents in a Publian system can
at best lay claim to having the qualifications their party believes
necessary to be a successful president. Parties have nevertheless
remained within what might be called a “zone of acceptability”

40 Jeff Flake, In a Democracy, There Can Be No Bystanders, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/opinion/jeff-flake-speech-letters-democracy.html.
41 Michael Wolff, “You Can’t Make this S--- Up”: My Year Inside Trump’s Insane
White House, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 4, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.hollywood
reporter.com/news/michael-wolff-my-insane-year-inside-trumps-white-house-1071504
[http://perma.cc/YJ6M-ME7T]; MICHAEL WOLFF, FIRE AND FURY: INSIDE THE TRUMP
WHITE HOUSE (2018).
42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
43 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).
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with regard to the candidates they present for the White House,
with presidential nominees perhaps deficient in one qualification
possessing other prerequisites for the oval office.
Even within this context, Donald Trump appears to be no
Rutherford B. Hayes, James Earl Carter, or even Warren G.
Harding who, unlike the vindictive Woodrow Wilson, pardoned
Eugene Debs and even invited him to visit Harding at the White
House (which Debs did).44 These less distinguished presidents
were thought competent to hold office by a substantial segment of
their party, including, crucially, experienced political leaders and
office-holders, even as members of the rival party and rival
factions of their party frequently jeered at their qualifications.
Moreover, commentators often exaggerate formal qualifications.
The most formally qualified presidents in our history, in terms of
the multiplicity of offices they occupied before moving to the
White House, were John Quincy Adams, James Buchanan, and
George H. W. Bush. Abraham Lincoln was among the least
qualified. Barack Obama scarcely teemed with obvious
qualifications for the office he sought. (His predecessor, George
W. Bush, had at least been governor for six years of a major
state.) What makes Donald Trump historically unique is his lack
of any serious qualification for public office and the ever-growing
consensus among informed members of his party that he is, in
addition, a menace to American constitutional institutions.
Republican members of Congress, unaware that their microphones
are on, have been caught describing Trump as “crazy” and have
not retracted such comments.45 Tennessee Republican Senator
Bob Corker stated on the record that “[t]he president has not yet
been able to demonstrate the stability, nor some of the
competence, that he needs to demonstrate in order to be
successful.”46 Texas Senator Ted Cruz, when speaking of Trump
prior to his nomination, stated: “This man is a pathological liar”
44 Peter Richardson, ‘Democracy’s Prisoner: Eugene V. Debs, the Great War, and the
Right to Dissent’ by Ernest Freeberg, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2008), http://www.latimes.
com/style/la-bk-richardson15-2008jun15-story.html [http://perma.cc/44EB-UTNP].
45 Philip Bump, Senators on hot mic: Trump is ‘crazy,’ ‘I’m worried,’ WASH. POST
(July 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/25/senators-on-hotmic-trump-is-crazy-im-worried/?utm_term=.3c36f79061e6 [http://perma.cc/X6MJ-6XKD].
46 Richard Cowan, Republican senator says Trump yet to demonstrate needed
stability, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-corker/
republican-senator-says-trump-yet-to-demonstrate-needed-stability-idUSKCN1AX2DW
[http://perma.cc/KB95-FWSW].
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who “doesn’t know the difference between truth and lies.”47 Many
congressional Republicans, of course, have remained relatively
silent, but as Sherlock Holmes noted long ago, dogs that do not
bark in the night can provide central clues. In this case, what is
striking is the nearly complete absence of Republican officeholders who are willing to counter Senator Corker, Senator Cruz,
Senator Flake, leading conservative columnists, and Admiral
Clapper by praising Trump’s capacity for sober judgment and
ability to be an adroit Commander-in-Chief.48
II. PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
So what, one might ask. Shouldn’t constitutional decision
makers—most importantly inhabitants of judicial office, but also
academics who play a vital role in socializing young would-be
lawyers—be committed to upholding universal and neutral
constitutional norms? Shouldn’t they suppress their “private”
(and therefore legally irrelevant) reluctance to do so and instead
permit President Trump to exercise the same presidential powers
as any other occupant of the Oval Office?49 Article II is facially
indifferent to the character of the office-holder. The Qualifications
Clause requires only that the President meet the age requirement,
be a “natural-born” citizen, and reside within the United States for
at least fourteen years before taking office.50 Lawyers, doctors,

47 David Wright et al., Cruz unloads with epic takedown of ‘pathological liar,’
‘narcissist’ Donald Trump, CNN (May 3, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/03/politics/
donald-trump-rafael-cruz-indiana/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q22F-YSGD].
48 Perhaps the most notable exception is Alabama Senator Lucius Strange, at a time
when he was desperately (and, it turned out, unsuccessfully) trying to hold on to the seat
to which he was appointed to succeed now-Attorney General Jeff Sessions. “President
Trump is the greatest thing that has happened to this country,” Strange has said. “I
consider it a biblical miracle that he’s there.” Not to be out-Trumped, but as it were, his
principal (and ultimately successful) opponent in the Republican primary, former state
Chief Justice Roy Moore proclaimed, “God puts people in positions he wants. I believe he
sent Donald Trump in there to do what Donald Trump can do.” Ben Jacobs, ‘A biblical
miracle’: Alabama GOP Senate primary set to test Trump’s reach, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 15, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/15/alabamagop-senate-primary-donald-trump-mitch-mcconnell [http://perma.cc/L49R-EB6V].
49 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Had Ted Cruz been elected, we might have
considered the “true” meaning of “natural born citizen.” Should a Puerto Rican citizen
who moved to the mainland when he was thirty decide to run for the presidency ten years
later, we could mull over whether Puerto Rico, though not a state, is now “within the
United States.” See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901). Chief Justice Fuller, in
his Downes dissent, asks if “a native-born citizen of Massachusetts [would] be ineligible if
he had taken up his residence and resided in one of the territories for so many years that
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other professionals, and many applicants for ordinary, minimum
wage positions must meet rigorous educational standards and
less rigorous character tests, but not the President of the United
States. The text states that “[t]he President shall be Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”51 not that
“the President shall be Commander in Chief, provided that he is
a mature adult.” The impersonal language of the text seemingly
compels a court considering the constitutionality of presidential
decrees that determine who is fit to enter the United States to
follow the same interpretive practices judges would follow if the
ban on entry was issued by Barack Obama, George W. Bush,
Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, or, were they eligible to
hold the office, St. Francis of Assisi or Adolf Hitler. That the
president in question is unfit to hold the office is not relevant
because “equal protection of presidents” requires that all be
treated as identical to one another.
We think this consensus is tragically mistaken, not only as a
matter of intellectual analysis, but, quite possibly, with regard to
the actual future of what Burke might have referred to as the
living and the yet unborn. We agree with the major premise.
Constitutional decision makers, when assessing President
Trump’s actions, should be guided by constitutional norms. We
disagree, however, with the near universal view that those norms
are indifferent to the particular office-holder. The Constitution
presupposes at least some version of what we call “Publian
presidents,” presidents with the character and capacity necessary
to exercise the vast powers conferred by Article II.
The term “Publian presidents” is drawn from The Federalist
Papers. Although we are not “originalists” as that term is used in
intra-mural debates among constitutional interpreters, we do
believe that understanding the knowable presuppositions
underlying the constitutional text is important. Americans do not
have a rigid duty to adhere to past norms or empirical
assumptions as to how institutions would work to achieve those
norms, but constitutional fidelity entails an intellectual duty to
examine how those responsible for the Constitution of the United

he had not resided altogether fourteen years in the states?” Id. at 357. Fortunately, these
speculations are beyond the scope of this article.
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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States thought constitutional institutions would work to achieve
constitutional norms, as well as to understand the back-up
systems they did (or did not) put in place, should particular
constitutional institutions fail. A wooden esteem for the
Founders’ parchment ignores their repeated emphasis on the
importance of learning from the “lessons of experience.” John
Marshall proclaimed in McCulloch v. Maryland that a
“constitution[] intended to endure for ages to come” must “be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”52 We break faith
with the framers and the American constitutional tradition when
we treat the Constitution as a mere set of rules that must be
followed even when following the letter of the rules subverts
more fundamental constitutional purposes.
The presidency of Donald Trump is one such “crisis of human
affairs” calling for constitutional adaptation. The framers, we
shall see, anticipated the possibility of such a constitutional
failure and provided constitutional decision makers with special
tools for constraining the anti-Publian president. They regarded
as only a rebuttable presumption that the President of the
United States would be a mature adult. Unlike Justice Antonin
Scalia, who regarded as a conclusive presumption that any child
born within a marriage was fathered by the husband, whatever
the demonstrable impossibility of that assertion,53 the framers
were empiricists committed to an evidence-based constitutional
politics and constitutional law.54
The selection process set out in the Constitution with regard
to presidents exhibits both the framing commitment to
republican leadership and their insistence that Americans be
empirically minded when determining how to obtain republic
leaders. As is well known, Americans were not (and are not
today) given the opportunity directly to elect their presidents.
That task is assigned to presidential electors. Not surprisingly,
immediately after assuring his readers that the president would
not enjoy the powers of a monarch in Federalist No. 67,55 Publius
immediately turns in Federalist No. 68 to elaborate how the
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis removed).
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989).
See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION xv (1996).
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
52
53
54
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constitutional scheme for a presidential election is designed to
guarantee, as far as is humanly possible, the selection of persons
with exceptional capacities and virtuous character.56
This process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of
president, will seldom fall to the lot of any man, who is not in an
eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for
low intrigue and the little arts of popularity may alone suffice to
elevate a man to the first honors in a single state; but it will require
other talents and a different kind of merit to establish him in the
esteem and confidence of the whole union, or of so considerable a
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate
for the distinguished office of president of the United States. It will
not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability
of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability
and virtue.57

Publius hedged when asserting that the electoral college will
assure that only “seldom” will the president be less than a
sterling individual. That suggests the importance of other,
“auxiliary precautions” to which we will turn presently. But one
cannot read this paragraph without believing that the electors
will be faithful trustees for the public in preventing the rise of a
scoundrel to our highest office. That this no longer describes the
actual role of electors, who are now viewed simply as “delegates”
of the voters who formally placed them in power, increases the
importance of other institutional mechanisms that secure the
election of a president with the character and capacity to operate
the constitutional order. If such mechanisms no longer exist,
then this raises fundamental questions about the relevance of
“originalism” in a constitutional universe bereft of the
institutions the framers thought vital to maintaining the
constitutional order they fashioned.
Publius discusses the character of the president before
discussing presidential powers. One can reasonably infer that the
scope of presidential powers is a function of the character of the
office-holder. Consider in this context the pardon power,
discussed in Federalist No. 74.58 A president must know when
mercy is required to rectify the inevitable errors in a system of
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
57 Id.
58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).

Do Not Delete

2018]

3/21/18 4:40 PM

The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents

149

procedural justice; but he must also know when service to the
republic requires pardoning even those who might validly be
accused of insurrection, like the participants in the Whiskey
Rebellion who were wisely pardoned by George Washington.
Publius tightly connects presidential power and presidential
character when stating, “a single man of prudence and good
sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the
motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the
punishment, than any numerous body whatever.”59 Prior to
Donald Trump and his pardon of “Sheriff Joe” Arpaio, one could
only speculate about what a president lacking in “prudence and
good sense” might make of the plenary power to pardon.
The theme of virtuous leadership runs through The
Federalist Papers, including the most canonical of all, Federalist
No. 10.60 Although some political scientists interpret Federalist
No. 10 as the first statement of what would come to be known as
interest-group pluralism,61 any close reading reveals the
likelihood of an “expanded republic” producing the election of
more virtuous leaders disposed to seek the public good or
“common interest,” rather than simply reflect the preferences of
their constituents.62 Other papers elaborate on the importance of
the character of the officials who will be exercising constitutional
powers. Federalist No. 57 declares that every political
Constitution should strike above all “to obtain for rulers, men
who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they
continue to hold their public trust.”63
Federalist No. 31 makes intimate the connection between the
character of an official and official powers. The text states that
“all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation, ought to
be referred to the composition and structure of the government,

Id. at 501–02.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
61 See, e.g., Martin Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the
Framer’s Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 56 (1959).
62 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59, 63 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(noting that elections in the extended republic “will be more likely to centre on men who
possess the most attractive merit”).
63 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
59
60
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not to the nature or extent of its powers.”64 Good government,
Publius repeatedly insists, needs broad powers.65 For this reason,
Americans then and now should not be obsessed with the powers
of the national government or with the powers of any individual
within the government. Rather, Publius would concentrate our
constitutional focus on whether the schemes for staffing
a government privilege the selection of persons able to
wisely exercise government powers. Presidential power is
constitutionally justified when the process for staffing the
presidency has generated “characters pre-eminent for ability and
virtue.”66 Contrary to one popular view of the Constitution as a
“machine that will run by itself,”67 independent of the actual
office-holders, Publius was more than aware that character was
important even if he certainly did pay attention to the
importance of well-designed institutional structures. Indeed, The
Federalist Papers integrates character and institutions. The
machine would “run by itself” only if the institutional structures
privileged the establishment of a republican leadership class and
provided incentives for maintaining their republican character
when in office.
These observations cast new light on Publius’s claim in
Federalist No. 51 that the separation of powers is an “auxiliary
precaution.”68 A back-up generator is an auxiliary precaution, not
the main power supply. A crucial feature of an auxiliary
precaution is that the system functions differently in times of
emergency. The back-up generator comes on only when the main
power fails. “Checks and balances” function similarly; other
institutions must step up more vigorously when constitutional
institutions, designed to ensure virtuous leadership, malfunction
and produce persons who lack the capacities that justify the
powers of their office and consequent respect from other officials.
This should not be viewed as “civil disobedience” or any other
extra-constitutional assertions of power, but instead, as the

THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
This is the central theme of Federalist No. 23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23
(Alexander Hamilton).
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
67 See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ed., 1986).
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
64
65
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generation of a “legal-constitutional opposition”69 contemplated
by the drafters themselves and instantiated in the institutions
they created.
If presidential powers are justified by the anticipated
character of the president, and if the separation of powers exists
in part to prevent leadership by unfit officials, then contrary to
much received wisdom, the persons responsible for the
Constitution did not intend for constitutional decision makers
charged with maintaining it to be indifferent to the character of
the president when assessing at any given time how much
executive power a particular president should wield. Publius
would not have constitutional interpreters be presidentindifferent. The Federalist Papers point to an important auxiliary
precaution in the original Constitution when emphasizing the
capacity for federal legislative and judicial officials to afford less
deference to an anti-Publian president.
III. GOING OFF-SCRIPT AND BROKEN PLAYS
Our claim that interpretation responds to breakdowns in
underlying assumptions is more ordinary than extraordinary.
Contract law and contract practice make adjustments when
background conditions that structured the bargain change in
ways not anticipated by the parties. Actors go off-script when
props malfunction or other actors forget previous lines. Athletes
improvise when the play called in the huddle breaks down
because of unforeseen developments. Conventional constitutional
wisdom that paradoxically is labeled “textualism” from the
perspective of these activities is both extraordinary and perverse
in insisting that constitutional decision makers not take into
account failings that any person with common sense would
recognize compel changing planned behaviors that have become
either impossible to perform or counterproductive.
The long tradition in American constitutionalism that
regards the Constitution of the United States70 as a collective
contract provides powerful support for interpreting constitutional

69 We owe this phrase to Ken Kersch, who provided very helpful comments to an
earlier draft.
70 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
1, 2–4 (1999).
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provisions in light of their background assumptions. Contract
law does not interpret every provision of a contract as having a
“no matter what” clause. Charles Fried, when analyzing the
famous case of Krell v. Henry,71 points out that the contract for
rooms to watch the coronation procession of Edward VII
contained neither the clause “unless there is no procession to
view” nor the clause “whether or not the coronation is
subsequently canceled.”72 Because the decision to enforce the
literal terms of the bargain was just as much an interpretation as
a decision to interpret the contract as not covering a cancellation,
Fried maintains that contract authorities had to consider which
interpretation best expressed the promises the parties made to
each other in light of a circumstance neither anticipated. Krell,
he concluded, correctly recognized that the contract between the
parties made sense only on the assumption that the coronation
would take place as planned, and that no damages should be paid
when events falsified that mutual assumption.73
Contract law in practice is even less committed to the
wooden textualism that would insert “no matter what” clauses
into all provisions in Article II. Stewart Macaulay’s study of
contractual relationships among businesspersons observes:
Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or
potential or actual legal sanctions. There is a hesitancy to speak of
legal rights or to threaten to sue in these negotiations. Even where
the parties have a detailed and carefully planned agreement which
indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to deliver on time,
often they will never refer to the agreement but will negotiate a
solution when the problem arises apparently as if there had never
been any original contract. One purchasing agent expressed a common
business attitude when he said, “if something comes up, you get the
other man on the telephone and deal with the problem. You don’t read
legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do
business again.”74

A constitution “intended to endure for ages to come,” a good
businessperson would recognize, should be interpreted in

Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (Eng.).
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
64 (1981).
73 See id. at 60–61, 67.
74 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963).
71
72
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ways that are responsive to failures in the functioning of
basic institutions.
Actors engage in similar improvisations as businesspersons
when faced with what contract law might call “frustration” of
script.75 The swan in Lohengrin fails to show up. The pulley
taking Don Juan to the underworld fails. A phone rings off cue. A
nervous performer completely misses crucial lines.76 When these
events occur, experienced, and most inexperienced, actors
respond. Sometimes a bon mot seems appropriate. “Does anyone
know when the next swan is leaving?” “It seems Hell has no
vacancies.” An apocryphal story relates that one actor picked up
the phone and promptly handed the receiver to the other, saying,
“It’s for you.” In other circumstances, actors adjust their lines to
the circumstances. They do not woodenly repeat the next line in
the script when the failure to say an earlier line makes their
planned line incomprehensible. Instead, actors think about what
they might say to enable the cast to perform the play as close to
as originally intended under the new, unanticipated circumstances.
Athletes respond the same way as businesspersons and
actors to failures in the assumptions underlying their texts.
Gifted sportspersons improvise when a play breaks down, as
when a baseball batter misses a hit-and-run signal or a football
receiver runs the wrong route. Faced with circumstances in
which following the letter of the plan will defeat the purpose of
the plan, athletes attempt to figure out alternatives for achieving
the purpose of the plan, knowing that while some members of
their team have failed, others are performing their expected
tasks. The runner scrambles back to first base. The quarterback
throws the ball to whatever receiver appears open.
The routine practices of businesspersons, actors, and
athletes illustrate how texts are routinely interpreted differently
when crucial background conditions fail. To be sure, the reasons
for going off-script must usually be plain.77 Strong presumptions

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265–69 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
For some of these and related mishaps discussed in this paragraph, see ANDREW
FOLDI, OPERA: AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN (40 YEARS OF MUSICAL MISHAPS) (1999);
Dick Cavett, Oh, No! Live Drama and Unwritten Humor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/opinion/oh-no-live-drama-and-unwritten-humor.html.
77 We might trust an experienced actor or athlete to make judgments to go off-script
that we would deny to their less experienced peers.
75
76
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exist in most interpretive practices that background conditions
are functioning smoothly. Nevertheless, improvisation plays an
important role in text-bound activities. When systematic
malfunctions occur, businesspersons, actors, and athletes engage
in a Dworkinian effort to make the text “the best it can be.”78 If a
contract to purchase weapons for a third party should be
interpreted on the assumption that the third party has not joined
a terrorist cell or indicated a strong desire to murder an
estranged spouse, a script should be interpreted on the
assumption that the phone will ring on cue, and a play should be
interpreted on the assumption that crucial participants have not
suffered serious injuries, then the constitutional clause “the
President shall be Commander-in-Chief”79 should be interpreted
in light of the assumption that the president is a mature adult
whom one would, at the bare minimum, feel comfortable hiring to
watch over one’s own children.
IV. JUDICIAL IMPROVISATION IN TIMES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently
adjusted constitutional doctrine when responding to breakdowns
in the fundamental assumptions underlying the constitutional
order. That tribunal for more than two-hundred years has been
Marshallian, with judicial “adaptation” a regular feature of the
attempt to resolve perceived crises. Some crises are external.
Supreme Court Justices have adjusted existing constitutional
doctrine in light of wars and economic depressions. Other crises
are internal. Much constitutional law, most notably the
constitutional law fashioned by mid-twentieth century judicial
liberals and the civil rights movement, has been a consequence of
adjustments made when constitutional institutions have not
functioned as expected.
Much constitutional doctrine that takes circumstances into
account reflects framing understandings that crisis would shake
the American constitutional regime and constitutional law would
adjust accordingly. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Schenck v.
United States refrained from wooden textualism when asserting

78
79

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 62 (1986).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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that “[w]hen a nation is at war,” the speech entitled to
constitutional protection shifts.80 In other cases, Justices have
adjusted constitutional doctrine to take into account crises no one
anticipated in 1789 or 1868. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell held that
constitutional protections for contracts had to be interpreted in
light of an economic collapse unforeseen by the framers.81 His
opinion insisted that constitutional decision makers committed to
“preserv[ing] the essential content and the spirit of the
Constitution”82 could not “confine[]” themselves “to the
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook
of their time, would have placed upon” various clauses.83 No
universal agreement exists about the validity or desirability of
these and numerous other “adaptations.” Prigg v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania,84 which one of us (Levinson) believes to be the
most execrable decision in our history, was arguably a “necessary
adaption” designed to maintain a constitutional order designed to
create, in Don Fehrenbacher’s words, a “slaveholding republic.”85
We are nevertheless confident that Americans cannot understand
their constitutional order by ignoring how decision makers,
including judges, treat what they believe to be genuine crises as
matters that must be addressed by the constitutional doctrine
rather than matters beneath the purview of fundamental law that
should be simply ignored.
The Supreme Court has been as creative when adapting
constitutional doctrine to internal constitutional crises. The most
famous footnote in the canon, footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,86 exemplifies the judicial response to what
came to be perceived as the constitutional failure of governing

80 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight[.]”).
81 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
82 Id. at 443.
83 Id.
84 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
85 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001). For
an account of Prigg as an unfortunate constitutional adaption, see Paul Finkelman, Story
Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994). For a more sympathetic treatment, see generally
MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
86 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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institutions adequately to protect the rights of vulnerable
minorities granted by the post-Civil War Amendments. The
Court, when announcing a program of remarkable deference to
legislatures when litigators challenged state and federal
commercial regulations, emphasized that stricter scrutiny might
be merited when courts had greater reasons to believe ordinary
legislative processes had malfunctioned.87 The Supreme Court’s
“double standard” of rights protection that emerged in the
mid-twentieth century was rooted in theories about the strength
and weaknesses of evolving constitutional institutions, rather
than on claims that some constitutional rights were more
important than others. The consensual greatest series of
decisions in Supreme Court history, Brown v. Board of
Education88 and the subsequent judicial rulings dismantling the
constitutional foundations for the Jim Crow state, required the
justices to modify longstanding judicial rules and practices to
prevent former Confederate states from getting away with what
they now deemed to be the equivalent of constitutional fraud,
instead of accepting the anodyne and remarkably obtuse
“neutrality” and deferential stance of such earlier decisions as
Pace v. Alabama and Plessy v. Ferguson.89
Louis Lusky, the law clerk generally considered responsible
for the Carolene Products footnote,90 maintained that justices
should normally sustain legislative outputs when political
processes were functioning as constitutionally expected. His 1942
essay in the Yale Law Review asserted:
[I]f every person has an equal opportunity to take part in controlling
the government which in turn controls him, there will be a general
confidence that the laws are designed to serve the needs of the entire
community, by making a fair adjustment between the conflicting
interests of groups within the community and advancing as far as
possible the welfare of the community as a whole.91

Race discrimination merited stricter judicial scrutiny because
constitutional institutions repeatedly malfunctioned when

Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Pace v. Alabama, 545 U.S. 1108 (2005); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896).
90 David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights:
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 765 (1981).
91 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1942).
87
88
89
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elected officials considered racial issues. “A government from
which [African-Americans] are largely excluded,” Lusky pointed
out, is not “properly responsible to their needs” with the end
result being that “general confidence in the just enactment of
laws will be greatly weakened.”92 The text of footnote four is a bit
confusing because two distinctive Carolene Products footnotes
exist. Paragraph 1, which was inserted at the request of Chief
Justice Hughes,93 maintains “certain rights deserve particular
judicial solicitude.”94 The far more influential paragraphs 2 and
3, providing the foundation for judicial protection of rights to free
speech and racial equality, are rooted in the “dynamics of
government,”95 a “corrective” for faulty “political processes.”96
The Carolene Products double standard was a judicial
attempt to adjust to two fundamental changes in the American
constitutional regime. The first was the constitutional
commitment to some version of interest-group pluralism as
opposed to the original constitutional commitment to some version
of republicanism. Lusky, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and
other constitutional decision makers in the mid-twentieth century
assumed that constitutional institutions should be designed in
ways that accommodated various social interests as opposed to
the Madisonian vision of government institutions designed to
transcend various social interests.97 The second was the
increased recognition that “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities” 98 prevented most elected officials from
accommodating the interests of persons of color to remotely the
same degree as white persons. Hence, in contrast to the original
understanding of the post-Civil War Amendments,99 courts
Id. at 5–6.
See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1093, 1097–98 (1982).
94 Id. at 1100 (emphasis removed).
95 Id. at 1097–98.
96 Id. at 1103.
97 For the classic expression of interest group pluralism, see DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (Alfred A. Knopf
eds., 1951). Federalist No. 10 is the classic expression of constitutional republicanism. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). For the classic account (and critique) of the transition from
republicanism to interest-group liberalism, see THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 2009).
98 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
99 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEXAS
L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2016).
92
93
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rather than legislatures took primary responsibility for securing
African-Americans and other racial minorities the “equal
protection of the law.”
In “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,”
Professor Wechsler unwittingly detailed how the Supreme Court
in Brown engaged in the constitutional improvisation called for
by Carolene Products to correct what were now deemed the
constitutional failures responsible for Jim Crow segregation.100
Wechsler insisted that the “question posed by state-enforced
segregation is not one of discrimination at all,” but concerned
“the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that
impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be
involved.”101 He reached the remarkable conclusion that Brown
was a freedom of association case by denying that judicial
authorities could know the crucial facts that might make Brown
a discrimination case. Such an approach was warranted on
matters on which courts should trust state officials. What Chief
Justice Warren understood, and Wechsler failed to acknowledge,
is that no reason existed in 1954 (or, for that matter, in 1896
when Plessy was decided) to trust a state legislative judgment
that separate schools promoted racial equality. The
“reconciliation” between Northern and Southern whites that
placed African-Americans both literally and metaphorically at
the back of the railway left neither Congress nor the courts
willing to implement the post-Civil War Amendments.
Fortunately, in ways “neutral principles” could not detect,
American politics had changed, particularly after World War II,
as well as the role of the Court.
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown presented an accurate picture
of how courts should function in normal constitutional times in a
regime committed to interest group pluralism. He began by
noting that justices have legal obligations to defer to legislative
fact-findings.102 Wechsler then denied that the evidence was
sufficient “to sustain a finding that the separation harms the
Negro children who may be involved[.]”103 Nor, apparently, could
courts ask about what actually motivated state legislatures to
100
101
102
103

See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 22–23.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 32–33.

Do Not Delete

2018]

3/21/18 4:40 PM

The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents

159

impose segregation. To inquire into the actual justification for
segregation would “involve an inquiry into the motive of the
legislature, which is generally foreclosed to the courts[.]”104
These claims that courts should normally defer to legislative
fact-findings and not inquire into legislative motives make sense
when, as Lusky noted, political processes are fair and open to all
so that political victors at any particular time might be fearful of
being displaced in the next election should they prove captive
simply to factional interests. This is the basis of John Hart Ely’s
aforementioned book that defends a vigorous concern by the
Court for “representation reinforcement,” but condemns judicial
intervention when representative government is thought to be
working reasonably well.105 Elected officials can then be trusted
to make good faith interpretations of the Constitution and take
rational steps to pursue the public good. Aggressive judicial
inquiry into facts and motives is counter-constitutional in times
of normal constitutional politics. The system for staffing the
national government and process for making laws are the
main devices for ensuring that elected officials make accurate
fact-findings and do not deliberately violate the Constitution. No
good reason exists for thinking courts will do any better than the
rest of the political system, especially if we are willing to accept
what may well be the legal fiction that Publian institutions are
generating Publian or quasi-Publian rulers and laws. This is why
the Supreme Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma106
subordinated suspicions that the Oklahoma legislature might
have been influenced by campaign donations of optometrists and
ophthalmologists when applying what is known as a “minimum
rationality test” that makes such suspicions irrelevant if a
possibly sane person could believe that the legislature was
genuinely motivated by a desire to safeguard the health, safety,
and welfare of Oklahomans. Perhaps eye-doctors did better with
respect to this law than the general public, but no good reason
existed to think that optometrists and ophthalmologists were
“special favorite[s] of the law”107 in post-World War II Oklahoma.

104
105
106
107

Id. at 33.
See ELY, supra note 18, at 182–83.
348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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The Southern white political actors who imposed
state-mandated segregation were not attempting to do what was
best for all races or acting on a good faith interpretation of the
post-Civil War Amendments. White elected officials in the former
Confederacy did not fear electoral displacement by aroused
African-American voters because they had taken care, by the
beginning of the twentieth century, to eliminate as much as
possible the reality of an African-American vote. Rather, as
speaker after speaker declared in the southern constitutional
conventions that provided the legal foundations for the Jim Crow
state,108 members of former Confederate states were trying to
find every constitutional loophole in order to subvert the
Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional commitment to racial
equality and, most importantly, the ostensibly unequivocal
commitment of the Fifteenth Amendment to the suffrage on a
non-racial basis. They were openly committing what Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes described as “a fraud upon the
Constitution of the United States.”109 In sharp contrast to
Wechsler, Holmes did not deny the presence of the fraud.
Instead, he said judges were without the practical power to
reinstate the kind of Reconstruction-era monitoring that would
be necessary to obviate the fraud.110
Brown makes sense only in light of a judicial commitment to
eradicate frauds upon the Constitution. Chief Justice Warren in
judicial conference had no difficulty basing his vote on motives
and facts the court had ruled out-of-bounds in ordinary cases. He
bluntly informed other justices that segregation was based solely
on white supremacy. “The doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’” he
stated when leading off the judicial conference on Brown, “rested

See PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH 217–25 (2017).
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy,
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 205, 297, 301–02 (2000) (describing
a full examination of this truly perfidious episode in our judicial history).
110 See Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. There was no nonsense about “neutral principles”
compelling the outcome in Giles. The Court’s decision in Brown II was quite Holmesian
inasmuch as the decision to settle for “all deliberate speed” was based on pragmatic
institutional considerations that were inattentive to facts on the ground. What made
Wechsler’s views distinctive was his utter indifference to pragmatic actualities and the
ascent into a thoroughly abstract analysis reminiscent of Anatole France’s famous
suggestion that the rich and poor alike would enjoy the opportunity to spend their nights
under the bridges of Paris when it snowed.
108
109
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upon the concept[ion] of the inferiority of the colored race.”111
Other justices agreed. Justice Robert Jackson, who more than
any other justice recognized that Brown could not be resolved by
the appropriate norms for resolving ordinary cases, determined
to vote to constitutionally prohibit segregated schools because “in
the South the Negro suffers from racial suspicions and
antagonisms” and “has suffered great prejudice from the
aftermath of the great American white conflict.”112 Jackson
recognized how the original constitutional mechanisms for
enforcing racial equality had malfunctioned when asserting in
oral argument, “I suppose that realistically the reason this case
is here is that action couldn’t be obtained from Congress.”113
Charles Black best captured the contemporary sense of why
Brown was correctly decided when he maintained:
[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which
is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an
inferior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded
whether such a race is being treated “equally,” I think we ought to
exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that
of laughter.114

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the case in which the
Supreme Court abandoned almost 200 years of precedent when
declaring that the First Amendment prohibited libel suits by
public officials unless they could prove the speech was either
intentionally false, or false and made with reckless disregard of
the truth, is another example of constitutional law bending in
response to the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim
Crow South.115 This strong and unprecedented116 holding was
motivated by commitments to racial equality as much as

111 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICAN’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 679 (1976).
112 Id. at 688 (quoting Memorandum from Robert H. Jackson on Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Feb. 15, 1954) (on file with Library of Congress)).
113 Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of Education: Some Notes on
Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 806 (2004) (quoting ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970)).
114 Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 422,
424 (1960).
115 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
116 Not quite. A few state courts had reached a similar result in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Coleman v. McLennan, 98 P. 281, 292 (Kan.
1908); Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press, 9 N.W. 501, 524 (Mich. 1881). For the origins of
actual malice, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 41–44 (1991).
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commitments to the First Amendment. The Sullivan litigation
was part of the southern strategy to prevent media coverage of
the civil rights movement by imposing huge libel damages for
minor misstatements.117 In the trial court, Lester Sullivan
obtained the largest damages award in Alabama history. Had
racial concerns been absent, everyone knew Sullivan probably
would have received nominal damages at most. The Supreme
Court decision overturning that ruling permitted The New York
Times, as well as major television networks, to remain in the
South and continue providing shocked Americans with stories of
police dogs attacking children on peaceful protest marches.
The Supreme Court in Sullivan also improvised when
issuing final judgment. The Court in an ordinary case would
have remanded the case back to the Alabama courts for
reconsideration in light of the new constitutional standard for
determining libel. The Justices knew, however, that Alabama
legal authorities would not determine in good faith whether
Sullivan was a victim of actual malice. Rather, Chief Justice
Warren could be confident that the courts in Alabama would
award damages no matter what the judicial standard. For this
reason, the Justices broke from routine practice, made a fact
finding that actual malice could not be found, and entered a final
judgment for The New York Times.118
Numerous other Warren Court decisions are best understood
as the judges altering rules of normal practice to account for
constitutional breakdowns in the Jim Crow South. Many of these
cases were resolved on grounds other than racial equality.
Michael Seidman details how the Justices conceptualized such
cases as Miranda v. Arizona as responses to racist law
enforcement practices rather than as efforts to construct neutral
rules of constitutional criminal procedure that would apply in all
times and places.119 A similar analysis could be offered of the
motivation behind the Supreme Court’s decision to enter what

117 See KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL
RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW AND THE FREE PRESS 69–70 (2011). The national press could have lost
millions of dollars in potential liability if they lost lawsuits filed throughout the South by
purportedly aggrieved white segregationists. Id. at 84–85.
118 See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285–86.
119 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1992); see
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Justice Felix Frankfurter called the “political thicket” of
legislative districting120 in Baker v. Carr and then far more
dramatically in Reynolds v. Sims, which upended the political
systems of almost all the states.121 Earl Warren viewed these
decisions as part of the “civil rights docket” of the Court, as
means to ensure urban African-American votes counted as much
as rural white votes.122 That Baker arose in Tennessee and
Reynolds in Alabama was not coincidental, even if the doctrinal
consequences, as in Sullivan, were national. “[T]he dominant
motif of the Warren Court,” Lucas Powe details, was “an assault
on the South as a unique legal and cultural region.”123
The Supreme Court during the civil rights era was
responding to the constitutional failure to protect the rights of
African Americans rather than engaging in ordinary
constitutional decision-making. Brown might be regarded as
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality,124
although when making that decision the Supreme Court did not
take seriously the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment,125 ignored evidence that Congress was primarily
responsible for implementing the Fourteenth Amendment,126
implicitly engaged in forbidden motive analysis, and did not give
elected officials the deference appropriate when a constitutional
order is functioning within normal parameters.127 Sullivan,
Reynolds, Miranda, Morgan v. Virginia,128 and related cases
however, belie constitutional politics as usual. The Supreme
Court would not have dramatically changed the constitutional
law of free speech, voting rights, constitutional criminal
procedure, and the Dormant Commerce Clause had the Justices
not regarded those cases as race cases and made rules to correct

See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 279–89 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590–625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122 See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 381 (1997).
123 LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000).
124 See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 230–31 (2011); Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1995).
125 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (1995).
126 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1361 (2016).
127 See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
128 328 U.S. 373, 374, 386 (1946) (striking down on Dormant Commerce Clause
grounds a Virginia law mandating segregation on interstate and intra-state motor cars).
120
121
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both the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim Crow
South and the constitutional failure of the elected branches of
the national government to respond to that breakdown.129
Contemporary constitutional civil rights law was forged in failure.
The Supreme Court has adjusted constitutional law when
responding to acute constitutional failures, as well as the chronic
failure of national, state, and local institutions to protect the
rights of persons of color. During the Civil War, the Justices
invented
procedural
mechanisms
for
avoiding
ruling
on the constitutional measures judicial majorities thought
unconstitutional.130 Most notably, in Roosevelt v. Meyer, the
Justices when holding no jurisdiction existed to determine
whether the Legal Tender Act of 1863 was constitutional, ignored
the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Supreme
Court jurisdiction whenever a state court denied a claim of
federal right.131 When peace was restored and normal
constitutional operations returned, the Justices immediately
overruled Roosevelt.132 The justices did not need decades to assess
whether a constitutional breakdown had occurred. The Civil War
Court abandoned precedent shortly after a constitutional crisis
began and restored the status quo shortly after the constitutional
crisis ended.
V. FROM JIM CROW TO THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT
Brown, Sullivan, and other seminal decisions dismantling
the segregated state provide the road map for constitutional
responses to the Anti-Publian presidency of Donald Trump. Both
Jim Crow and Trump’s election occurred because constitutional
institutions failed, whether the failure was inherent in the
institutions themselves or in the people operating the
constitutional institutions. Constitutional decision makers faced
with constitutional failures, American history teaches, jettison
rules of constitutional practice and constitutional interpretation
rooted in assumptions that constitutional institutions are
functioning normally. The Warren Court, when dismantling Jim

See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text.
This paragraph summarizes Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy:
Deciding to Decide During the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33–66 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
131 See Roosevelt v. Myers, 68 U.S. 512, 517 (1863).
132 See Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U.S. 687, 687 (1871).
129
130
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Crow, abandoned presumptions that former Confederate states
were making good faith interpretations of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Justices on that tribunal refused to defer to decisions
made by white supremacists in circumstances that justified
substantial deference to elected officials committed to
constitutional norms. They did not assume good motives or
rational decision making when segregationists claimed that
separate but equal benefited persons of all races. While Donald
Trump remains president, judges and other governing officials,
when interpreting such exercises of executive power as the travel
ban, the ban on transgendered persons in the armed forces, the
withholding of federal funds from sanctuary cities and orders to
prosecute Trump’s political rivals should be similarly wary. They
should assume that Trump is far more devoted to pandering to
his base by keeping unconstitutional campaign promises rather
than defer to post hoc accounts of the underlying facts invented
by administration lawyers for litigation purposes only. No one
should assume Trump is engaged in rational decision making in
the public interest when he makes decisions that seem better
explained by his family’s financial interests or his desire to avoid
criminal prosecution.
When an anti-Publian president runs for office repeatedly
promising flagrant constitutional violations, courts should adopt
the presumption that the efforts to implement that platform
violate the Constitution until the program is redesigned in ways
that eliminate unconstitutional features “root and branch.”133
Donald Trump on the campaign trail declared he would prevent
Muslims from immigrating to the United States.134 His first
travel ban looked suspiciously like a Muslim ban. President
Trump declared the executive order a travel ban.135 Lower courts
were therefore correct in taking the President at his word rather
than taking seriously the novel arguments administrative
lawyers made in court when defending the constitutionality of
the travel ban (“EO-2”). The Fourth Circuit, after pointing to

Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
These campaign statements are summarized in Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2017).
135 Eugene Scott & Ariane de Vogue, Trump says he’s calling it a ‘travel ban,’ CNN
(June 5, 2017, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/politics/trump-travel-bancourts/index.html [http://perma.cc/LNL3-TUHH].
133
134
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Donald Trump’s “numerous campaign statements expressing
animus towards the Islamic faith” and “his proposal to ban
Muslims from entering the United States,” concluded:
Plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2’s stated
national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for
its religious purpose. And having concluded that the “facially
legitimate” reason proffered by the government is not “bona fide,” we
no longer defer to that reason and instead may “look behind” EO-2.136

Constitutional decision makers have no more reason to
assume that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on
rational policy judgments than the Warren Court had to believe
that segregated schools were grounded in reasonable pedagogy.
The “minimum rationality” (or “rational basis”) test assumes a
president (or other elected official) makes good faith efforts to
pursue the common good or a plausible constitutional vision
underlying the dominant political party.137 A president who has
demonstrated a fondness for white supremacists138—more so
than any other president since Woodrow Wilson left the White
House—does not satisfy the conditions for deference on racial
issues. A president who consistently puts his business interests
ahead of the national interest139 does not meet the standard for
deference when a potential conflict of interest is present. When
Trump issues an executive order on matters that trench on race
or Trump family business interests, other constitutional decision
makers ought to demand a set of probable facts that clearly
support the order, and not be satisfied with rationales developed
for litigation purposes by the White House legal staff that bear
little resemblance to the actual justifications for the announced
policy. Members of the White House legal staff may have a
lawyer’s duty to be “zealous” in presenting all conceivable
arguments in favor of their client, although whether lawyers who
collect their paychecks from the United States instead of from

136 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591–92. For a similar argument, see
Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik, Against Deference: Considering the Trump Travel Ban,
Take Care (Dec. 8, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/against-deference-considering-thetrump-travel-ban [http://perma.cc/YED5-63L7].
137 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
138 See Bret Stephens, President Jabberwock and the Jewish Right, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v9MUnk.
139 See Keith Whittington, Possibly Impeachable Offenses: The Need for Congressional
Investigation, NISKANEN CENTER (Aug. 2, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/possiblyimpeachable-offenses/ [http://perma.cc/DG7L-79NK].
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Donald Trump personally can be singularly devoted to their
individual client instead of the interests of the American people
is debatable. Those on the receiving end of such argument labor
more clearly under no such duty.
Constitutional decision makers have no more reason for
empowering Donald Trump to make complex policy decisions
than they had to empower white supremacists to make decisions
about race. The present delegation doctrine assumes a president
has expertise or, more often, access to expertise on complex
empirical and scientific questions.140 A president who does not
care to be informed on and routinely lies about basic domestic
and foreign policy matters141 does not meet this standard for
open-ended delegations. Courts should therefore require clear
statements from Congress that the Trump administration is
authorized to make a policy before permitting the administration
to make that policy.
Many devices for disempowering the Trump administration
apply standard judicial canons for avoiding constitutional
litigation. Courts are expected to interpret statutes as not raising
difficult constitutional problems, such as the scope of presidential
authority, whenever possible. Justice Louis Brandeis, in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, famously declared:
“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”142 Given the
probability that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on
unconstitutional motives, engage in unconstitutional self-dealing,
or do not meet constitutional standards for rational policy
making, the judicial obligation to refrain from making
unnecessary constitutional decisions should compel courts to
require Congress to delegate clearly when Congress wishes to
empower Donald Trump.

See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405 (1928).
See David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Lies, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.
html?mcubz=0; see also David Brooks, Getting Trump Out of My Brain, N.Y. T IMES
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/opinion/getting-trump-out-of-mybrain.html?mcubz=0 (“There’s nothing more to be learned about Trump’s mixture of
ignorance, insecurity and narcissism. Every second spent on his bluster is more
degrading than informative.”).
142 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
140
141
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The constitutional universe will hardly fall apart should
courts and other constitutional decision makers, explicitly or
implicitly, engage in motive analysis, up the standard of scrutiny,
and interpret statutes as not delegating power when adjudicating
Trump Administration efforts to exercise Article II powers. The
constitutional universe did not fall apart when the Supreme
Court abandoned inherited practices in order to repair the
constitutional breakdown caused when southern (and many
northern) governing officials committed to white supremacy
refused to make good faith interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause. The innocuous Brown opinion generated a
healthy debate over what policies are entailed by a constitutional
commitment to racial equality.143 On some doctrinal matters,
most notably free speech, courts have largely retained precedents
that supported civil rights protestors and media coverage of the
civil rights movement.144 On other doctrinal matters, most
notably state action, courts largely abandoned precedents that
struck down Jim Crow practices when litigants sought to extend
those decisions to non-racial matters.145 On still other doctrinal
matters, most notably constitutional criminal procedure, liberals
and conservatives dispute whether rules put in force to prevent
official racial abuses should remain in place today.146
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama
v. Holder147 illustrates how Supreme Court Justices debate the
status of precedents that respond to constitutional failures. All
parties to that case agreed that “[t]he Voting Rights Act of 1965
employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary
problem.”148 Chief Justice John Roberts began his opinion by
recognizing that “racial discrimination in voting” was “an
insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious
defiance of the Constitution,” and that “exceptional conditions

143 See Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939,
1004–08 (2008).
144 See, e.g., Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014).
145 See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 273, 276–77 (2010).
146 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
147 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
148 Id. at 2618.
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can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”149
Roberts then announced that the test originally adopted by
Congress when passing the seminal Voting Rights Act of 1965
that triggered what might well be called “strict scrutiny” by the
Justice Department over any changes in voting laws by states
was no longer needed in 2013, and therefore had become
unconstitutional as an unnecessary incursion on state
autonomy.150 Justice Ginsburg insisted that the prophylactic
rules adopted by Congress in 1965 still made sense and that the
judicial policy of deferring to Congressional judgment as to the
remedies for voting discrimination should be maintained.151 Both
Roberts and Ginsburg endorsed judicial decisions that adjusted
constitutional doctrine in response to failures within the
constitutional order. They disputed only whether those failures
had been corrected and whether doctrine forged in constitutional
failure ought to be maintained for the foreseeable future.152
The dispute between Roberts and Ginsburg in Shelby County
highlights how the present question is not whether limits on the
singular presidency of Donald Trump should apply forever to all
future presidents. Future constitutional decision makers may
conclude that both Trump and the rules used to constrain Trump
were temporary aberrations or they may conclude that Trump
represented a more enduring change in the American
constitutional order that requires more enduring doctrinal
adjustments. “Adaptation” by definition must be responsive to
circumstances, but what those circumstances are and whether
they warrant adaption is always controversial. The question is
when what appears to be “settled doctrines” warrant some degree
of “unsettlement” in light of what may be temporary aberrations
or enduring changes in a constitutional order. If judicial decisions
limiting the power of the Trump Administration unsettle
constitutional law a bit, that may be a good thing,153 reminding
us of the continuing wisdom of Justice Holmes’s placement of

Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 334 (1966)).
Id. at 2631.
151 Id. at 2652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152 Compare id. at 2625 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”),
with id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting ongoing “‘second generation barriers’ to
minority voting”).
153 See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–8 (2001).
149
150
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“experience” over “logic” as the most important motivating force
for an effective legal order.154
CONCLUSION
Clinton Rossiter some seventy years ago published a truly
important and disturbing book on the phenomenon of what he
called “constitutional dictatorship.”155 Drawing in his American
chapter primarily on Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, he argued
that in times of crisis, the United States, like Great Britain,
France, and Germany (and ancient Rome), placed near-plenary
power in their leaders to confront perceived crises.156 Rossiter
dismissed any argument that we could in fact eliminate the
need for “constitutional dictatorship.” 157 That would require
eliminating the presence of emergencies or crises that elicited
displays of what could, under ordinary times, be described as
presidential overreaching. Contemporary presidential power is
here to stay, even if modified to some degree. More than ever, we
have good reason to ask about the trustworthiness of presidents
in whose hands we necessarily place immense powers that quite
literally touch on national and world survival.
Problems with presidential impeachments, as well as the
enormous power of the president, further support our claims that
non-Publian presidents ought not be trusted with Publian
powers. An August poll revealed that forty-three percent of those
surveyed support Trump’s impeachment, with twelve percent
supporting censure by Congress.158 By October 31st, according to
Public Policy Polling, the number had climbed to forty-nine
percent, with only forty-one percent opposed.159 Still, this
solution is close to a fantasy. Whether one believes that the
framers
in
Philadelphia
explicitly
rejected
making

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 1881).
See generally CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1979); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin,
Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010).
156 ROSSITER, supra note 155, at 207–314.
157 Id.
158 Tom O’Connor, Trump Impeachment Is Most Popular Solution Among Americans,
Poll Says, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trumpimpeachment-most-popular-solution-americans-655556 [http://perma.cc/ZY36-SSVX].
159 See Support for Impeachment at Record High, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.publicpolicypolling.com/polls/support-impeachment-recordhigh/ [http://perma.cc/YU4N-2TYA].
154
155
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administrative “malfeasance” a ground for impeachment,160 or
instead simply thinks Republicans in Congress—out of party
loyalty or fear of their base—will not impeach for political
malfeasance, 161 advocating impeachment or invoking the
Twenty-fifth Amendment at present is a form of expressive
politics unresponsive to the constitutional problems presented by
a lawless chief law enforcement officer of the land and a
Commander-in-Chief who lacks the emotional maturity to toss off
even trivial slights.
One possible argument against our claim that the
constitutional powers of the president are not indifferent to the
officeholder is the possibility that the Framers of the
Constitution, fearing human infallibility, drew firm lines in the
sand. This constitution is one of fixed rules because human
beings are tempted to abuse power otherwise.162 The Constitution
of the United States “view[s] the abuse of power as the
paramount evil,” Frederick Schauer maintains, and “thus
choose[s] to minimize the occasions on which the abuse of power
is not blocked, even at the cost of . . . imped[ing] the pursuit of
the Good.”163 Those who take this view believe that even if acting
on the consensual view that President Trump is unfit to hold
office will have good short-term consequences, constitutional
rules should be woodenly followed because in the long run,
constitutional decision makers are more likely to misuse, rather
than properly use, authority to constrain a president they believe
a menace to constitutional government and perhaps to regime
and human survival.164

See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 114–15 (2006).
For an argument that Congress may impeach for political malfeasance, see
Whittington, supra note 139.
162 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED 21 (2012).
163 Frederick Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41,
50 (1987).
164 See
Jonathan Turley, What’s worse than leaving Trump in office?
Impeaching him., WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/08/24/whats-worse-than-leaving-trump-in-office-impeaching-him/?
utm_term=.10c28cfcdf40 [http://perma.cc/8T96-H3RC] for a fine example of such
woodenness. Turley fears that impeaching Trump, at least on the basis of what is known
about him as of late August 2017, “would fundamentally alter the presidency, potentially
setting up future presidents to face impeachment inquiries or even removal whenever the
political winds shifted against them.” Id. Turley does not provide any reason for thinking
Trump is fit to hold office. He does not deny, for example, that the Constitution of the
United States presently entrusts a president who cannot ignore the most trivial insult
with the power to begin a nuclear war. Turley’s argument, an example of neutral
160
161
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The problem with interpreting constitutional powers as
officeholder-indifferent is that The Federalist Papers make clear
that the Constitution of fixed rules is not the Constitution of the
United States. The fixed rules that comprise what Levinson
terms the “Constitution of Settlement” concern the rules for
staffing offices and making laws.165 The powers of each branch of
the national government are as much a part of what Levinson
terms the “Constitution of Conversation” as the “majestic
generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Some constitutional
rules explain why presidents are elected like clockwork every four
years.167 Other constitutional provisions explain why presidential
power varies considerably over time and with each president;
Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan were given far more
deference by other officeholders than Herbert Hoover or Andrew
Johnson.168 Treating Donald Trump as a normal president
exercising normal Article II powers would be a far greater break
from this historical practice than recognizing that a bigoted,
ignorant liar should not be accorded the same deference as a
president who might plausibly claim to be “pre-eminent for
ability and virtue.”169
The obvious question in 2018 is whether realists committed
to an experience-based politics should expect highly partisan
members of Congress—and judges who are increasingly
themselves identify with a single political party—to play their
Publian role. That the answer may be no speaks to what Jack
Balkin has termed “constitutional rot,”170 not to the underlying
presuppositions of the Publian constitutional order that,
paradoxically or not, most Americans profess to respect. The
strongest response to our argument is that (almost) no one today

principles run riot, is equivalent to the claim that Congress should not ban human
sacrifices for fear of creating a precedent that might empower the national legislature in
the future to ban religion.
165 Levinson, supra note 162, at 19.
166 Id. at 278.
167 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
168 For studies demonstrating variance in presidential power over time and between
presidents, see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1972).
169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
170 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
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takes truly seriously the notion of civic virtue and organizing our
polity around it. That idea, associated with “civic republicanism,”
was replaced by a much more “liberal” notion of politics that
accepts the basic reality that all of us are motivated primarily by
self-interest and unable (or, at least, unlikely) genuinely to tame
those impulses in behalf of some evanescent idea of the “public
interest” when the common good conflicts with our interests.171
One can find strong hints of this view in Federalist No. 10,
perhaps the most canonical of all of the eighty-five Federalist
essays. Down that road lies the Holmesian “bad man,” who looks
at law simply as a price system that announces the costs of legal
non-compliance, which assumes, of course, that the law will in
fact be enforced.172 From one perspective, Trump is simply the
latest exemplar of the “bad man” who in effect now constitutes
our political order.
Recent events nevertheless suggest that, outside of
Congress, other government officials are implicitly recognizing
that Trump is not entitled to the same Article II prerogatives as
presidents constitutionally fit for office. Military officials have
not blindly followed presidential orders or have suggested they
may refuse when they doubt presidential authority. Secretary of
Defense James Mathis and other military leaders dragged their
feet or flatly refused to implement Trump’s Twitter order
banning transgendered patriots from serving in the armed
forces.173 General John Hyten, the head of the U.S. Strategic
Command, declared that he will not automatically obey a
presidential order to use nuclear weapons.174 Lower federal
courts have been unusually stingy with presidential authority.
Within weeks of Trump’s taking office, Benjamin Wittes and
171 The seminal work on classical republicanism is JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). For discussions of the differences between constitutional
republicanism and constitutional liberalism, see Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988).
172 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897).
173 See Travis J. Tritten, Coast Guard commandant signals he will resist Trump’s
military transgender ban, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.washington
examiner.com/coast-guard-commandant-signals-he-will-resist-trumps-military-transgenderban/article/2630294 [http://perma.cc/N4PV-UW8G].
174 Daniella Diaz, Top general says he’d push back against “illegal” nuclear strike
order, CNN (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/18/politics/air-forcegeneral-john-hyten-nuclear-strike-donald-trump/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q774-RNU6].
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Quinta Jurecic observed “a large number of judges around the
country behav[ing] in a fashion untouched by deference or any
kind of presumption of regularity in the President’s behavior[.]”175
Federal courts have repeatedly found constitutional fault with
Trump’s travel bans.176 Federal District Court Judge William
Orrick recently granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the
Trump Administration’s efforts from denying federal funding to
sanctuary cities.177 Wittes and Jurecic suggest the “unprecedented
barrage of leaks that has plagued the Trump administration”
reflects common understandings that Trump is unfit for office.178
“[W]hen the bureaucracy doubts the president’s oath,” they write,
“that fact gravely frays the executive’s ordinary comparative unity.
The people who work for the president no longer connect loyalty to
the executive branch with the lofty goals to which the oath seeks
to bind the president, so they become much more likely to act on
their own.”179 No military officer, judge, or leaker has justified his
or her actions by claiming that Trump lacks the executive powers
of previous presidents.180 Nevertheless, the lack of deference to
presidential authority that persons outside of Congress have
demonstrated in Trump’s first year seems unprecedented.
Perhaps we are wrong about Donald Trump. Perhaps we are
wrong about whether constitutional powers are indifferent to the
officeholder. We are not wrong in thinking that the political order
in the United States is in a severe state of constitutional rot.181
We hope with this paper to provoke specific constitutional
conversations about the powers of an anti-Publian president,
more general conversations about constitutional practice and
interpretation during times of severe constitutional failures, and
even more general conversations about whether the path to a
more functional constitutional order lies in fixing our

175 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whathappens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH].
176 See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
177 See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d. 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
178 Wittes & Jurecic, supra note 175.
179 Id. Wittes and Jurecic further observe that when a “large number of people in the
press cannot start with the presumption that the president is making a good faith effort
to do his job . . . the press no longer presumes that any presidential statement is true.” Id.
180 Or, alas, cited a draft of this essay!
181 See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, U. MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5–9, 11–13).
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constitutional order through better interpretations of
constitutional provisions, changes in the constitutional culture
responsible for the anti-Publian president, or changes in the
constitutional text that generated the anti-Publian president.
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